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Abstract
The purpose of this paper is to revisit an intriguing nding. Although over the
last few decades leading up to the nancial crisis there was a marked reduction
in the volatility of aggregate output and ination, there appears to have been a
corresponding increase in the sales volatility of individual rms. Here we argue that
a signicant reason for this apparent increase in rm level volatility was an increase
in churning of rm activity through the acquisition and disposal of businesses. This
created an increase in observed negative covariances between rms, so even if the
volatility of underlying organic growth has also fallen, observed volatility has risen.
JEL: D12, E52, E43.
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21 Introduction
A puzzle of the years before the nancial crisis of 2008-9 was that, while aggregate
volatility in both output and ination had fallen to historic lows, there was an apparent
rise in volatility at the rm level. Campbell, Lettau, Malkiel, and Xu (2001), amongst
others, document increasing stock price volatility. A series of papers using the Compustat
company accounting dataset report increasing sales growth volatility for public listed
rms (Chaney, Gabaix, and Philippon, 2002, Comin and Philippon, 2005, Comin and
Mulani, 2006). On the other hand, using the LBD database that contains plant level
data on all US rms, private as well as public, Davis et al (2006) nd that, overall, rm
volatility has declined. They conclude that the increased volatility among public rms
was overwhelmed by a fall in the volatility of private rms.
Comin and Philippon (2005) develop an explanation for the volatility puzzle in which the
growing importance of proprietary assets such as R&D leads to increasing volatility at
the rm level but falling covariance between rms.
Instead, in this paper, we argue that there is a simple data-consistency explanation
why the observed volatility in sales growth in the Compustat population is a misleading
correlate for US macroeconomic volatility. An increase in the churning of rm activity
raises the reported sales of rms who acquire, and reduces the reported sales of rms that
dispose of businesses. So, an active market for businesses creates an increase in negative
covariances between rms, so that, even if the volatility of underlying organic growth had
fallen during the great moderation, observed sales volatility in the population of quoted
companies rose.
In other words, although in terms of GDP the acquisition or divestiture of rms in the
economy is a neutral event (at least in the short run), it has a signicant e¤ect on the
reported sales volatility of individual companies. Comin and Mulani (2006) recognize
this problem but imply that the problem is with large takeovers and can be addressed by
winsorizing at, say, sales growth rates above 50%. In fact, some rms do exhibit organic
growth rates of this level. Relatively small business acquisitions and disposals generate
signicant churning in terms of observed sales growth. As we show, there are many such
transactions.
In a later paper Comin et al claim to adjust for the e¤ect of takeovers, but do not explain
how they do it. It seems likely that they used Compustat variable 249, the e¤ect of
acquisitions on sales. Unfortunately, although this eld is available in Compustat, it is
sparsely populated and is non zero in only a small fraction of cases where a rm was
known to have acquired or disposed of businesses during the period.
In section 2 we revisit the volatility evidence and update the numbers to 2015, to include
years after the nancial crisis. In section 3 we develop a simple model of acquisitions and
disposals and show that an increase in the market for businesses raises the volatility of
rms but leaves aggregate volatility unchanged. In section 4 we combine the Compustat
quoted company dataset with the SDC database of acquisitions and disposals. We show
that the information on acquisitions and disposals in Compustat is incomplete and we
identify a very large number of transactions from SDC. We note that, although SDC
provides valuable information on the occurrence of an acquisition and a disposal it does
3not always give any information about the value of the transaction nor a direct measure
of the e¤ect of this activity on sales of the acquiring or divesting rm. In section 5 we
turn to some estimation results. Section 6 concludes.
2 Firm and Aggregate Volatility
In this section we use Compustat company accounts data on individual rms to reprise
and update the evidence on volatility in Comin and Philippon (2005) and Comin and
Mulani (2006). While these papers report volatility data up to 1997, we use individ-
ual company data to 2015 that, allowing for the forward looking term, gives volatility
measures to 2011.
We compute a measure of volatility of the ith rm as the moving average of the standard
deviation of the growth of real sales, where nominal sales are deated by the CPI1. gi;t is
the ith rms growth in period t:
i;t =
vuut[ 1
10
+5X
k= 4
(gi;t+k   ~gi;t)2] (1)
~
gt;iis the mean of growth rates between t   4 and t + 5. The weighted growth of the
standard deviation of real sales is then:
wi;t =
vuut[ 1
10
+5X
k= 4
!it(gi;t+k   ~gi;t)2] (2)
The weight !it = Sit=
PN
j=1 Sjt, where N is the number of rms in any given year. The
results are shown in Figure 1 below where we plot the median of the distribution in each
year. The estimates are computed using data from 1950 to 2015.
Figure 1 captures the rising rm-level volatility, described by Comin and Mulani, to 1997.
In fact, volatility continued to rise and peaked at about 2000. It declined thereafter, but
by 2011 it was still at levels higher than in the rst half of the 1990s.
1We exclude nancial rms (standard industrial classication 6000-7000).
4Figure 1. Firm Level Volatility.
Figure 2 reports the volatility of US annual GDP on the same basis as the 10 year t  4,
t+5 moving average of the standard deviation of the growth of real GDP, and reveals the
striking fall in macroeconomic volatility in the two decades before the nancial crisis, in
other words the period known as the great moderation. From 2003 the forward-looking
element kicks in with the nancial crisis of 2008-9. Since the crisis there has been an
increase in aggregate volatility.
In Figure 3 we treat data on individual rms in a di¤erent way. We rst aggregate the
real sales of rms, and then we calculate the moving average of the standard deviation
of the growth in the aggregate, using equation (1). In this case we observe a decline in
volatility during the great moderation and an increase thereafter. But the decline in rm
volatility appears to start earlier than the decline in the volatility of GDP.
By summing sales of rms rst rather than looking at the median of individual rms
sales volatility, the negative covariances between rms are largely cancelled out when
we look at the aggregate gures. In the next section we provide a simple model where
negative covariances between rms arise from the market for businesses in which rms
acquire assets from other rms or dispose of assets by selling to other rms.
5Figure 2: Volatility of real US GDP
Figure 3: Volatility of aggregate real sales growth of public companies.
63 Model
In this section we develop a model in which there is a market for businesses. A rm can
grow by purchasing another rm or parts of it, and can contract by selling o¤ parts of its
operations. If a rm acquires more assets its sales will rise, while if it disposes of assets,
sales fall.
Consider a population of N rms. For simplicity the population of rms is constant, and
there are no exits or entry. Let us assume, rst, that rms do not sell or acquire other
businesses. At any given time, t, each rm, i 2 f1:::Ng, produces an output yi;t. We
assume that production follows a drift process:
yi;t = i + +yi;t 1 +  i;t + "t (3)
where  i;t  iid (0; 2i ) represents a rm specic shock to output and "t  iid (0; 2")
represents an economy wide, or sector specic shock to output. The drift parameter i is
given exogenously. Production translates directly into sales, so inventories are not held.
Subtracting yi;t 1, we can write each rms organic growth (i.e., rmsgrowth without
acquisitions and disposals) as:
goi;t = yi;t = i +  i;t + "t (4)
The variance associated with this organic growth is then:
2goi;t = Vt

goi;t

= 2i + 
2
" + 2Cov
 
 i;t; "t

(5)
Where rm specic, idiosyncratic shocks are uncorrelated with sector specic or aggregate
shocks this simplies to:
2goi;t = Vt

goi;t

= 2i + 
2
" (6)
Consider the aggregate sales of all rms, Y at = N
 1PN
i=1 yi;t. The variance of this growth
in aggregate sales is given by:
2gat = Vt [g
a
t ] =
NX
i=1
2goi;t + 2
NX
i=1
iX
j=1
Cov
 
goi;t; g
o
j;t

(7)
where Cov
 
goi;t; g
o
j;t

= Cov
 
 i;t; j;t

+Cov
 
 i;t; "t

+Cov
 
j;t; "t

+2". Since we assume
rm-specic shocks are uncorrelated between rms:
Cov
 
goi;t; g
o
j;t

= Cov
 
 i;t; "t

+ Cov
 
j;t; "t

+ 2" (8)
Now let us suppose that rms can acquire or dispose of assets to other rms. Let acijt
denote the net acquisition of rm i from rm j at time t, and acit =
Pn
j=1 acijt denote
rm is total net acquisitions. Note that acijt =  acjit, since a positive net acquisition
by i from j must be associated with an identical net disposal by j to i;so the sum of all
total net acquisitions must equal zero, ACt =
Pn
i=1 acit = 0.
7Assuming that acquisitions/disposals translate directly to output, we can now rewrite
rmsproduction process:
yi;t = ai + yi;t 1 + acit +  i;t + "t (9)
Subtracting yi;t  1, rms now have individual total growth gi;t = yi;t = goi;t + g
ac
i;t, which
is composed of their organic growth, goi;t, and their acquisition/disposal growth, g
ac
i;t. The
variance in rmstotal growth is:
2gi;t = Vt

goi;t + g
ac
i;t

= 2goi;t + 
2
gaci;t
+ 2Cov
 
goi;t; g
ac
i;t

(10)
where Cov
 
goi;t; g
ac
i;t

= Cov
 
acit;  i;t + "t

. This gives us our rst result:
Result 1: Acquisitions or disposals increase (decrease) the volatility of a rms growth
if and only if 2gaci;t > (<)   2Cov
 
goi;t; g
ac
i;t

. i.e., acquisitions/disposals increase volatility
if they are positively related to or independent of organic growth.
We now consider aggregate sales, Yt = N 1
PN
i=1 Yi;t. Because total acquisitions sum
to zero, it follows that the variance of aggregate total growth is exactly the variance of
aggregate organic growth (i.e., 2gt = 
2
got
).
Result 2: Acquisitions or disposals have no e¤ect on the volatility of aggregate growth.
4 Acquisition and Disposal in Compustat and SDC
In the this section we examine the empirical evidence on the relationship between the
volatility of the growth of individual rms and acquisitions and disposals. In a real world
setting the population of rms is not constant, there are exits through full acquisition
and bankruptcy and new rms enter the population. The rms that we examine are
quoted in the US, so if a rm is private it will not show up in the sample, and if US rms
purchase foreign assets or dispose of assets abroad this will not enter the sample either.
There are other data-consistency explanations why the observed volatility in sales growth
in the Compustat population is not a direct correlate for GDP volatility. There were sig-
nicant compositional shifts in the Compustat population over the period under review
that a¤ected its measured volatility. Compustat was underweight in smaller public com-
panies before 1970, but became complete thereafter. Subsequently, the prole of the
quoted population itself changed when, in the technology boom of the 1990s, many very
young and volatile rms were listed.
Firm-level studies focus on the volatility of sales, whereas GDP is a measure of value
added. Sales is a component of value added, but even if an increase in sales volatility
is demonstrated at the rm level, we need to understand how the rms cost structure
mitigates this to yield value added. Firms can hedge prot and cash ow, but the reported
sales number is unhedged.
The reported sales and income of a multinational rm are the consolidated global sales
of that rm and its subsidiaries, aggregated by converting the local results at the average
exchange rate ruling during the period. The overseas element is not a component of US
8GDP. Suppose a rm is growing at 5% and has half its sales overseas. A 10% decline in
its local currency versus the $ over the year doubles the reported sales growth in the US.
Though it would be invaluable to observe the components of total sales growth, excluding
acquisition and currency e¤ects to reveal organic growth, this disclosure is not required
by GAAP. Some, usually larger, rms do disclose this data, but this is not collected
reliably by data providers.
The SDC Platinum database from Thomson Financial provides a record of M&A deals
that is now widely used as the source for economic research into takeovers2. We use
SDC data to identify whether each Compustat rm had either acquired, or disposed, of
subsidiaries in each nancial year. The accounting impact of an acquisition or disposal
is recorded by the ultimate holding company or the buying or selling rm. By matching
the cusip codes of SDC deal participants to the Compustat population we draw two,
overlapping, sets of acquisitions and disposals: the population of acquisitions where the
ultimate parent of the acquirer or seller was a US database3 Compustat constituent.
Acquisitions and disposals were excluded if they involved a purchase or sale of a stake
but no change of control, since control is the criterion for the target rms sales to be
recognized or derecognized in the accounts of the ultimate parent company. The SDC
e¤ective datewas used to associate, possible multiple, acquisitions and disposals to
Compustat nancial years. Note that the nancial year end varies between rms. It is
important to understand how a single acquisition or disposal a¤ects the reported sales
growth of the companies involved over multiple periods. Suppose company A buys a
division from company B halfway through year t, and for convenience suppose A, B, and
the division all have the same underlying organic growth rate, g. In year t, A includes,
and B excludes, just half of the divisions sales for the year. In year t+1 A includes, and
B excludes, a full years sales from the division. In year t+2, the rate of sales growth
returns to g. So in terms of annual growth rate in sales, company A experiences three
inection points and company B mirrors this. So in terms of observed company/year
growth rates, one transaction generates six inection points in the population.
SDC contains two promising elds, for the targets most recent sales, and for the transac-
tion value. However the saleseld is only sparsely populated and, as other researchers
have noted, the valueeld is quite incomplete. Deal value is only available for slightly
under half of transactions. Hence we generated two dummy variables, a 0/1 indicator of
acquisition/disposal activity in each company year.
2See, for example, Harford (2005), Colak and Whited (2007), Dong et al (2006), Rhodes-Kropf et al
(2005), and Warusawitharana (2007).
3Compustat has also a global database. We do not use this data because our primary interest is
volatility in the US.
9Figure 4: Kernal Density of All Firms real
sales growth. 1950-2015. Winsorized at
100:
Using observations for 1982 to 2015 from Compustat we have 204,975 rm/years. Figure
4 plots annual growth in real sales for this population as a kernel density, winsorized
at 100%:Although the distribution is leptokurtic, with fat tails; it is symmetric with
skewness of .0046, and standard deviation of 28.085. The mean is 5.99. So we are as
likely to see a decline in sales as an increase.
4.1 Acquisitions and Disposals: The Market for businesses.
We use the SDC Platinum database to tabulate the extent of acquisition and disposal
of businesses between 1982 and 2015. Maksimovic and Phillips (2001) report evidence
for an earlier and overlapping period. They nd that between 1974 and 1992 an average
of almost 4 percent of large manufacturing plants changed ownership. There is a large
literature on mergers and acquisitions involving the sale of entire organisations4, and there
is also a large and growing market for the partial disposal and acquisition of businesses.
Figure 4 plots the total number of rms that acquired business assets among the quoted
population (excluding nancial rms) or divested of businesses. Note that in some cases
these will involve multiple acquisitions or disposals.
4For some of this literature see Andrade et al (2001), Colak abd Whited (2007), Denis and Shone
(2005), Golbe and White (1988), Graham et al (2002), Harford (2005), Ming et al (2006), and Rhodes-
Kropf et al (2005).
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Figure 5: Number of rms that acquire and divest.
Figure 6 plots the proportion of rms that were involved in acquisitions or disposals.
At the peak of each merger cycle more than 20 percent of US quoted companies were
involved in acquisition each year.
Figure 6: Percentage of rms acquiring or disposing of
businesses.
The actual numbers in each year after combining Compustat and SDC are shown in
11
Tables 1 and 2. The second column reports the total value at current prices (when
we actually know the value). This peaks in 2000 at the height of the IT stock market
boom and a merger and acquisitions upswing. The third column gives the total number
of transactions and column 4 the number of rms involved in each year. Around the IT
peak of 2000 about 20% of quoted rms were involved. In Table 2 we report divestitures.
As with acquisitions divestitures peaked in 2000 with about 13% of rms involved. These
tables draw attention to the enormous amount of churning in the corporate asset market
as rms (often simultaneously) both acquire and divest assets.
Table 1: Acquisitions: 1982 - 2015.
Year Total Value (£Mil) Transactions Number of Firms % of Firms
1982 24397.02 796 559 7.35
1983 39773.06 1208 852 10.72
1984 53796.97 1009 710 8.68
1985 73845.87 664 489 5.80
1986 95481.14 1218 785 8.93
1987 79233.27 1041 695 7.81
1988 133440.4 1405 888 9.81
1989 142644.7 1881 1138 12.53
1990 77278.81 2036 1221 13.14
1991 72323.33 2208 1341 13.89
1992 66840.64 2412 1436 13.95
1993 107521.7 3154 1753 16.01
1994 178705.5 3767 1952 16.85
1995 293645.1 4178 2174 17.72
1996 317162.1 5115 2403 19.21
1997 564571.3 6579 2702 21.71
1998 892973.8 6773 2756 21.92
1999 971370.9 5665 2530 20.50
2000 1182243 4650 2287 19.26
2001 589560.1 3314 1821 16.23
2002 362108.7 3019 1728 16.11
2003 297232.4 3398 1808 17.28
2004 452812.4 3568 1874 18.13
2005 667705.2 4038 1919 18.72
2006 888904.8 4201 1959 18.65
2007 878743.5 4184 1887 17.83
2008 616574.3 3522 1652 16.00
2009 409811.3 2186 1215 11.88
2010 532224.6 2746 1340 12.85
2011 642470.9 3104 1400 12.74
2012 651370.1 2945 1366 12.31
2013 565934.9 2445 1212 11.01
2014 680298.6 2694 1264 11.83
2015 954938.1 2584 1243 12.18
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Table 2: Divestitures: 1982 - 2015.
Year Total Value (£Mil) Transactions Number of Firms % of Firms
1982 28598.64 240 240 3.16
1983 19805.15 452 452 5.69
1984 53396.29 619 619 7.57
1985 62217.52 531 531 6.30
1986 75120.41 603 603 6.86
1987 71531.29 655 655 7.36
1988 99389.76 782 782 8.64
1989 89590.68 918 918 10.11
1990 91037.89 918 918 9.88
1991 38968.57 852 852 8.82
1992 38858.23 857 857 8.33
1993 49583.25 943 943 8.61
1994 98366.38 1073 1073 9.26
1995 132996.7 1227 1227 10.00
1996 227043.8 1392 1392 11.13
1997 319510.7 1491 1491 11.98
1998 574480.1 1580 1580 12.57
1999 647861.6 1669 1669 13.52
2000 759025 1582 1582 13.32
2001 705797.8 1437 1437 12.81
2002 247267.7 1234 1234 11.51
2003 224488.9 1174 1174 11.22
2004 276094.3 1140 1140 11.03
2005 564740.9 3641 1056 10.30
2006 825383.6 3748 1082 10.30
2007 993851.8 3708 1099 10.38
2008 734776.4 3317 1040 10.07
2009 652001.6 3021 938 9.17
2010 504353.8 2763 857 8.22
2011 199861.8 963 576 5.24
2012 224535 1084 639 5.76
2013 284210.1 1115 684 6.22
2014 304278.4 1170 670 6.27
2015 402129.8 1104 623 6.10
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4.2 Growth in Sales
In this section we compare the rate of growth of real sales by those rms who acquired
or disposed of businesses in any given year compared to those rms that did not. The
results for acquisitions and disposals are shown in Tables 3 to 6. Table 3 reports the
median of real sales growth for acquiring and non-acquiring rms, where the acquisition
took place in the current year. Column 2 shows average (nominal) sales in each year
for all rms. Column 3 shows average growth rates of sales when the acquisition is in
the current year. Column 4 shows the average growth of rms that did not make an
acquisition in the current year. The di¤erences in rates of sales growth between acquirers
and the rm average are shown in columns 5 and 6. There is a clear tendency for those
rms that have made an acquisition in the current year to grow signicantly faster than
those rms that have not made an acquisition in the current year. A similar exercise for
Disposals is shown in Table 5. Here sales growth rates for rms disposing of assets is
signicantly less than the rm average.
However, in itself this is not necessarily evidence against the Comin/Mulani model since
it may be that rms who are growing rapidly for other reasons are in a better position to
make acquisitions, or rms that are in trouble may wish to divest assets5. We conduct
the same exercise for the relationship between acquisitions and disposals in the previous
year in Tables 4 and 6. Again the same pattern emerges. There are a number of rms
that simultaneously acquire rms and divest in the same year, as they rationalise their
businesses or sell on unwanted, acquired assets.
5 Estimation Results
We regress the rate of growth of real sales against various measures of corporate asset
market operations in a panel with xed e¤ects. In Table (7) two dummy variables are
used. dvacqt takes a value of 1 if the rm acquired another rm in that year - whatever
the actual value of the transaction - and zero otherwise. dvdist takes a value of 1 if a rm
divests - whatever the value of the transaction - and zero otherwise. Although there is a
large amount of noise with a very low R2; acquisitions are correlated with larger growth
with real sales and disposals are correlated with lower growth. The rst column includes
rms for which we have at least 2 years of data. We include up to 2 lags in acquisitions
and disposals, as we argued earlier that the e¤ects are spread over three years.
The next columns increase the minimum number of rm years to at least 30, which we
still have data for on more than 2000 rms. Using OLS with a lagged dependent variables
comes up against the Nickell bias, even as the number of cross section units goes to innity
the OLS estimates are still inconsistent when the number of years is small (Nickell,1981),
however, when the number of years exceeds 30 the bias disappears6.
5Denis and Shome (2005) nd that operating performance at the rm and industry levels are negatively
related to asset disposals and asset disposals are positively related to the rms debt ratio and its level
of diversication. Empirically they study 130 publicly traded rms that each reduce their book value of
assets by at least 25% in one scal year between 1985 and 1994.
6Alternatively we could have used the ArellanoBond (1991) estimator.
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Table 3: The e¤ect of acquisition on Sales Growth in current time period.
Median Sales Growth (%) Deviation
Year All Firms Acquirers Non-Acquirers Acquirers Non-Acquirers
1982 -2.93 0.11 -3.21 3.04 -0.29
1983 4.41 8.44 3.86 4.03 -0.54
1984 7.83 12.40 7.45 4.57 -0.38
1985 2.52 7.47 2.24 4.95 -0.28
1986 4.42 9.27 3.93 4.85 -0.49
1987 6.58 12.41 6.08 5.83 -0.50
1988 6.53 11.71 5.81 5.18 -0.72
1989 2.77 7.82 1.99 5.05 -0.78
1990 0.49 6.59 -0.59 6.09 -1.09
1991 -1.38 3.09 -2.15 4.47 -0.77
1992 2.86 7.73 2.05 4.87 -0.82
1993 5.23 9.64 4.35 4.41 -0.87
1994 9.11 15.48 7.50 6.37 -1.61
1995 9.18 14.67 7.62 5.48 -1.57
1996 9.16 17.19 7.32 8.03 -1.84
1997 9.30 18.91 6.83 9.61 -2.47
1998 7.85 17.15 5.36 9.29 -2.50
1999 8.57 17.56 6.64 9.00 -1.92
2000 8.95 17.49 7.03 8.54 -1.92
2001 -0.83 4.28 -1.90 5.10 -1.07
2002 -0.69 3.30 -1.49 3.99 -0.80
2003 5.12 9.09 3.77 3.97 -1.35
2004 9.22 12.60 8.00 3.38 -1.22
2005 7.42 11.54 6.13 4.12 -1.29
2006 7.86 9.92 7.12 2.06 -0.74
2007 6.38 9.45 5.37 3.07 -1.01
2008 3.31 5.85 2.41 2.54 -0.90
2009 -6.46 -3.87 -7.09 2.58 -0.63
2010 7.52 9.49 7.01 1.98 -0.51
2011 6.11 9.56 5.05 3.45 -1.06
2012 2.14 4.74 1.52 2.60 -0.63
2013 3.30 5.32 2.81 2.03 -0.49
2014 4.59 6.46 4.02 1.87 -0.57
2015 1.31 3.68 0.75 2.37 -0.56
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Table 4: The e¤ect of acquisition on Sales Growth in the previous time period.
Median Sales Growth (%) Deviation
Year All Firms Acquirers Non-Acquirers Acquirers Non-Acquirers
1982 -2.93 0.41 -3.02 3.34 -0.10
1983 4.41 8.22 4.11 3.81 -0.30
1984 7.83 13.78 7.32 5.95 -0.51
1985 2.52 6.66 2.19 4.14 -0.32
1986 4.42 10.91 3.97 6.50 -0.45
1987 6.58 14.14 5.72 7.57 -0.85
1988 6.53 12.70 5.88 6.18 -0.65
1989 2.77 8.92 2.12 6.16 -0.64
1990 0.49 6.59 -0.46 6.09 -0.96
1991 -1.38 3.80 -2.07 5.18 -0.70
1992 2.86 8.86 1.92 6.00 -0.94
1993 5.23 10.47 4.42 5.25 -0.81
1994 9.11 16.31 7.83 7.20 -1.29
1995 9.18 16.59 7.44 7.41 -1.74
1996 9.16 16.44 7.64 7.28 -1.52
1997 9.30 18.80 7.31 9.50 -1.99
1998 7.85 18.39 5.32 10.53 -2.53
1999 8.57 14.62 6.72 6.06 -1.84
2000 8.95 15.08 7.23 6.13 -1.72
2001 -0.83 3.92 -1.98 4.75 -1.15
2002 -0.69 4.01 -1.61 4.71 -0.92
2003 5.12 10.19 3.70 5.06 -1.43
2004 9.22 14.56 7.77 5.34 -1.44
2005 7.42 12.11 6.10 4.69 -1.31
2006 7.86 9.70 7.32 1.84 -0.54
2007 6.38 8.29 5.75 1.91 -0.64
2008 3.31 5.90 2.35 2.59 -0.96
2009 -6.46 -5.09 -6.88 1.37 -0.42
2010 7.52 9.95 7.06 2.43 -0.46
2011 6.11 9.48 5.11 3.37 -1.00
2012 2.14 4.31 1.62 2.17 -0.52
2013 3.30 5.38 2.81 2.08 -0.48
2014 4.59 6.22 4.07 1.63 -0.52
2015 1.31 2.81 0.92 1.50 -0.40
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Table 5: The e¤ect of disposals on sales growth in the current year.
Median Sales Growth (%) Deviation
Year All Firms Disposers Non-Disposers Disposers Non-Disposers
1982 -2.93 -6.63 -2.84 -3.70 0.09
1983 4.41 -0.14 4.60 -4.54 0.20
1984 7.83 2.65 8.14 -5.18 0.31
1985 2.52 -4.24 2.74 -6.76 0.23
1986 4.42 -1.59 4.74 -6.00 0.32
1987 6.58 2.90 6.80 -3.68 0.23
1988 6.53 3.88 6.82 -2.64 0.29
1989 2.77 0.77 3.10 -2.00 0.34
1990 0.49 -1.20 0.78 -1.70 0.28
1991 -1.38 -4.57 -1.00 -3.20 0.38
1992 2.86 -0.96 3.44 -3.82 0.58
1993 5.23 -0.30 5.98 -5.52 0.75
1994 9.11 3.61 9.79 -5.51 0.67
1995 9.18 4.40 9.86 -4.79 0.68
1996 9.16 2.97 9.85 -6.19 0.69
1997 9.30 4.44 9.94 -4.85 0.64
1998 7.85 3.37 8.49 -4.48 0.63
1999 8.57 3.42 9.28 -5.15 0.71
2000 8.95 3.75 9.58 -5.20 0.64
2001 -0.83 -4.82 -0.15 -3.99 0.68
2002 -0.69 -6.11 -0.15 -5.42 0.55
2003 5.12 1.41 5.51 -3.71 0.39
2004 9.22 4.78 9.81 -4.44 0.59
2005 7.42 2.17 8.14 -5.25 0.72
2006 7.86 3.77 8.52 -4.09 0.66
2007 6.38 3.15 7.12 -3.23 0.74
2008 3.31 -0.03 3.76 -3.34 0.45
2009 -6.46 -11.29 -5.91 -4.83 0.55
2010 7.52 3.87 8.00 -3.65 0.48
2011 6.11 3.53 6.40 -2.59 0.29
2012 2.14 -0.64 2.31 -2.78 0.17
2013 3.30 1.00 3.44 -2.30 0.14
2014 4.59 2.00 4.86 -2.59 0.27
2015 1.31 -4.96 1.84 -6.27 0.52
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Table 6: The e¤ect of disposals on sales growth in the previous year.
Median Sales Growth (%) Deviation
Year All Firms Disposers Non-Disposers Disposers Non-Disposers
1982 -2.93 -5.85 -2.91 -2.92 0.02
1983 4.41 2.01 4.42 -2.39 0.02
1984 7.83 4.97 7.89 -2.86 0.06
1985 2.52 -1.92 2.72 -4.44 0.21
1986 4.42 -0.10 4.61 -4.51 0.19
1987 6.58 4.45 6.68 -2.13 0.10
1988 6.53 4.58 6.68 -1.94 0.16
1989 2.77 1.29 2.90 -1.47 0.13
1990 0.49 0.20 0.59 -0.29 0.09
1991 -1.38 -4.45 -1.03 -3.07 0.35
1992 2.86 0.61 3.22 -2.25 0.36
1993 5.23 0.66 5.68 -4.57 0.46
1994 9.11 4.72 9.67 -4.40 0.55
1995 9.18 6.10 9.60 -3.08 0.42
1996 9.16 4.82 9.73 -4.34 0.58
1997 9.30 3.85 9.98 -5.45 0.68
1998 7.85 4.80 8.28 -3.06 0.43
1999 8.57 4.33 9.14 -4.24 0.57
2000 8.95 4.00 9.55 -4.95 0.60
2001 -0.83 -4.37 -0.36 -3.54 0.47
2002 -0.69 -3.70 -0.26 -3.01 0.44
2003 5.12 2.70 5.34 -2.43 0.21
2004 9.22 6.99 9.61 -2.23 0.39
2005 7.42 4.08 7.81 -3.34 0.39
2006 7.86 4.35 8.34 -3.51 0.48
2007 6.38 4.15 6.83 -2.24 0.45
2008 3.31 1.27 3.64 -2.04 0.33
2009 -6.46 -9.45 -6.09 -2.99 0.37
2010 7.52 5.02 7.85 -2.50 0.33
2011 6.11 4.55 6.41 -1.57 0.29
2012 2.14 0.51 2.28 -1.63 0.14
2013 3.30 1.66 3.41 -1.63 0.11
2014 4.59 1.53 4.92 -3.06 0.33
2015 1.31 -5.41 1.90 -6.73 0.59
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There still remains a possible problem with endogeneity. In Table (8) we report a reduced
form estimate of the model. These are consistent estimates and suggest that the dummy
variable for acquisitions has a positive e¤ect on sales growth and the dummy variable for
disposals has a negative e¤ect. In column 2 we control for rm-specic factors - Tobins
Q7 , Qt, and the change in the rate of prot, t, (ebitda divided by sales). In column
3 we control for some common macroeconomic factors: the growth in real GDP, yt,
the ination rate, t, the short term, rst, and long term, rlt, interest rates and the real
exchange exchange rate, rext, (export prices divided by import prices). In column 4 we
control both for rm-specic and common factors. Finally, in column 5 we estimate the
reduced form for the model of column 4, treating the 2 dummy variables as endogenous.
5.1 Goodwill, Total Assets, Acquisitions and Disposals.
So far we have used a simple dummy variable to capture the way in which acquisitions
and disposals a¤ect sales growth. However, US GAAP (generally accepted accounting
principles) determines which asset are included on the balance sheet of a company. We
now exploit the balance sheet accounting that accompanies acquisitions and disposals.
Typically, home grown intangible assets such as brands and patents are written o¤and do
not appear in the balance sheet (Higson, 2012). However, if a company acquires another
company this is recognised in the balance sheet and total assets should change to reect
the acquisition/disposal of assets.
The acquisition of a business brings some mix of tangible assets (property, plant and
equipment), inventory, loans, assets, other long-term assets, and intangibles, and, nally,
goodwill which is the residual item measuring the di¤erence between the price paid for an
acquisition and the carrying values of the identiable assets and liabilities acquired. The
acquired net assets are added to/subtracted from total assets in the balance sheet. How-
ever, some part of an increase in total assets will also reect the underlying organic growth
of the company. US companies do now report a breakdown of the acquired/disposed as-
sets, but this has only started to appear in Compustat since 2010.
In Table (9) we add the change in the log of real total assets, tat. This turns out to be a
highly signicant addition to the model with the overall R2 increasing to over 37 percent,
compared to the results in Tables (7) and (8). The inclusion of real total assets reduces
the size and the signicance of the 2 dummy variables for acquisitions and disposals. In
the second equation in Table (9) we drop the dummy variables entirely, reducing the R2
only very slightly.
5.2 Endogeneity
In this section we try to take account of possible endogeneity of sales growth and acquisi-
tions and disposals. In Table (10), we use the panel of (2177) rms that have more than
7We use the Tobins Q constructed by Peters and Taylor (2017) for both tangible and intangible
investment. We are grateful to Ryan Peters for making the data and denitions available .
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Table 7: Fixed E¤ects Panel Model
All years 10 years + 20 years + 30 years +
st st st st
st 1 -0.0742*** -0.0412*** -0.0133*** 0.00922**
[0.00206] [0.00218] [0.00260] [0.00332]
DV acqt 6.714*** 6.222*** 4.296*** 2.842***
[0.319] [0.310] [0.298] [0.310]
DV acqt 1 8.678*** 7.738*** 6.152*** 5.270***
[0.325] [0.318] [0.307] [0.321]
DV acqt 2
-2.950*** -2.962*** -2.612*** -2.418***
[0.328] [0.320] [0.310] [0.325]
DV dist -11.82*** -11.11*** -9.546*** -7.753***
[0.401] [0.387] [0.367] [0.365]
DV dist 1 -6.440*** -5.527*** -4.253*** -3.582***
[0.416] [0.400] [0.378] [0.377]
DV dist 2 -3.964*** -3.705*** -3.314*** -2.590***
[0.424] [0.406] [0.381] [0.378]
intercept 4.173*** 4.122*** 4.305*** 4.079***
[0.106] [0.104] [0.103] [0.107]
N 258051 223597 151529 93717
overall R2 0.0062 0.009 0.0109 0.0119
Standard errors in brackets
* p<0.05, **p<0.01, *** p<0.001
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Table 8: Fixed E¤ects Panel Model. Firm specic and common aggregate
controls.
30 years +
st st st st st
st 1 0.0121*** 0.0823*** -0.0057 0.0677*** 0.0706***
[0.00333] [0.00411] [0.00332] [0.00411] [0.00412]
DV acqt 2.320*** 4.220*** 3.182***
[0.229] [0.310] [0.229]
DV acqt 1 5.208*** 4.604*** 6.529*** 5.458*** 5.756***
[0.310] [0.237] [0.320] [0.236] [0.233]
DV acqt 2 -2.806*** -2.133*** -1.129*** -1.259*** -1.243***
[0.318] [0.241] [0.324] [0.240] [0.239]
DV dist -4.989*** -6.822*** -4.544***
[0.275] [0.362] [0.271]
DV dist 1 -4.908*** -2.246*** -2.512*** -1.569*** -2.144***
[0.369] [0.283] [0.373] [0.279] [0.276]
DV dist 2 -3.432*** -1.749*** -1.070** -0.706* -1.030***
[0.374] [0.284] [0.376] [0.281] [0.281]
Qt 0.687*** 0.789*** 0.795***
[0.0727] [0.0712] [0.0715]
Qt 1 0.957*** 0.700*** 0.718***
[0.0797] [0.0784] [0.0787]
t 6.673*** 6.016*** 5.982***
[0.183] [0.180] [0.180]
t 1 3.069*** 2.617*** 2.653***
[0.184] [0.180] [0.181]
yt 142.3*** 141.1*** 142.0***
[6.544] [6.162] [6.186]
yt 1 -15.55** -22.36*** -23.18***
[5.815] [5.266] [5.286]
t 56.53*** 64.68*** 64.28***
[11.94] [10.84] [10.87]
t 1 -61.21*** -48.41*** -48.00***
[10.19] [9.191] [9.219]
rst 0.646*** 0.249* 0.246*
[0.125] [0.103] [0.103]
rst 1 -0.173 -0.427*** -0.409***
[0.126] [0.106] [0.106]
rlt -0.136 -0.1 -0.123
[0.214] [0.173] [0.173]
rlt 1 -0.19 0.507*** 0.503***
[0.171] [0.146] [0.146]
rext -10.03* -26.06*** -25.86***
[4.291] [4.318] [4.335]
rext 1 29.24*** 39.26*** 38.54***
[4.271] [4.027] [4.042]
intercept 4.024*** 2.696*** -2.228*** -5.292*** -5.020***
[0.104] [0.113] [0.592] [0.609] [0.600]
N 93717 58145 93717 58145 58145
overall R2 0.007 0.073 0.038 0.107 0.100
Standard errors in brackets
* p<0.05, **p<0.01, *** p<0.001
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Table 9: Fixed E¤ects Panel Model. Firm specic and common aggregate
controls and change in real total assets.
st st
30 years +
st 1 -0.104*** rst -0.284** st 1 -0.104*** rst -0.316***
[0.00416] [0.0873] [0.00416] [0.0874]
DV acqt -0.520** rst 1 -0.0459 DV
acq
t rst 1 -0.0276
[0.196] [0.0897] [0.0893]
DV acqt 1 2.508*** rlt 0.148 DV
acq
t 1 rlt 0.199
[0.202] [0.147] [0.147]
DV acqt 2 -0.345 rlt 1 -0.0778 DV
acq
t 2 rlt 1 -0.131
[0.205] [0.124] [0.123]
DV dist -2.420*** rext -14.95*** DV
dis
t rext -14.25***
[0.230] [3.675] [3.682]
DV dist 1 -0.115 rext 1 21.18*** DV
dis
t 1 rext 1 20.39***
[0.236] [3.431] [3.432]
DV dist 2 0.454 tat 50.72*** DV
dis
t 2 tat 51.12***
[0.239] [0.381] [0.376]
Qt 0.242*** tat 1 25.36*** Qt 0.233*** tat 1 25.95***
[0.0611] [0.433] [0.0613] [0.430]
Qt 1 -0.0372 tat 2 -1.933*** Qt 1 -0.0334 tat 2 -2.044***
[0.0679] [0.370] [0.0681] [0.367]
t 3.968*** intercept -2.959*** t 3.910*** intercept -2.834***
[0.154] [0.519] [0.155] [0.470]
t 1 0.890*** t 1 0.838***
[0.155] [0.156]
yt 102.5*** yt 102.0***
[5.242] [5.253]
yt 1 -14.02** yt 1 -13.07**
[4.485] [4.493]
t 90.57*** t 89.95***
[9.215] [9.206]
t 1 -42.80*** t 1 -42.23***
[7.828] [7.817]
N 57619 57619
overall R2 0.3753 0.3725
Standard errors in brackets
* p<0.05, **p<0.01, *** p<0.001
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30 years of data over the period 1982 to 2014 using a GMM estimator with xed e¤ects.
In the rst column of results we endogenise only real total assets.8 and use rm-level
Tobins Q and the change in real protability as well of exogenous aggregate variables as
excluded instruments. The IV coe¢ cient of t is much larger than the OLS estimate
in Table (10), nevertheless, some overall tests of the model are not particularly good.
There is a signicant reduction in R2, and while the Anderson LR statistic rejects the
null that the excluded instruments are not relevent, the Cragg-Donald F statistic rejects
a test for weak instruments. The Sargan test is a test of overidentifying restrictions. The
joint null hypothesis is that the instruments are valid instruments, uncorrelated with the
error term, and that the excluded instruments are correctly excluded from the estimated
equation.
The second column of estimates includes the rm-level Tobins Q and the change in
protability. The Craig-Donald F Statistic does not now reject the null, at least for the
case if we set the maximum acceptable bias to 0.05 (i.e. we tolerate a bias of 5% relative
to OLS). However, the Sargan test suggests that we should also include (some or all)
of the aggregate variables. In column 3 we include aggregate growth, ination and the
lagged short term interest rate. The model now comfortably passes all of the tests.
6 Conclusion
We provide evidence to suggest that the apparent increase in the volatility of individual
rms during a period of lessening volatility at the aggregate level can be directly related
to the market for corporate assets with many rms acquiring or divesting businesses,
sometimes at the same time.
First, we replicate and update the work of Comin and Philippon (2005) and Comin and
Mulani (2006) using the Compustat accounting dataset. The median volatility of the
sales growth of individual rms peaked in about 2000, but still remained at higher levels
than in the mid-1990s. However, when we sum the real sales of all quoted companies the
volatility of the aggregate behaves in a similar why to the volatility of GDP, declining
during the great moderation and rising after 2007. This suggests negative covariances
between individual rms that cancelled out in the aggregate.
We propose a simple model in which these negative covariances reect activity in the
market for corporate assets, in which some rms acquire the assets and thus the sales
of businesses, and other rms disposed of the assets and sales of businesses. Compustat
over most of the sample period was incomplete in recording acquisitions and disposals.
We use the SDC Platinum dataset to collect data on the year a rm acquired or disposed
of businesses. Firms that grew more rapidly than the average tended to have acquired
businesses, while those growing more slowly than average had disposed of businesses.
We also report estimation results which reinforce these ndings. The change in the total
assets of the rm do reect acquisitions and disposals indirectly and we nd a strong
relationship between the growth of the rm and the change in total assets, controlling for
the endogeneity between growth, acquisitions and disposals.
8We use the IVREG28 code of Baum, Scha¤er and Stillman (2007).
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Table 10: Fixed E¤ects, GMM, IV Panel Model.
st st st
st -0.105*** -0.0923*** -0.106***
[0.00795] [0.0118] [0.0245]
tat 103.9*** 67.21*** 139.0***
[2.012] [5.735] [23.01]
tat 1 20.53*** 26.90*** 9.473*
[0.823] [1.671] [3.920]
tat 2 -2.746*** 4.880*** -17.20***
[0.587] [1.136] [4.133]
Qt -19.78*** -9.976
[1.371] [5.552]
Qt 1 14.06*** 5.098
[1.168] [3.537]
t 34.69*** -76.95***
[3.216] [19.99]
t 1 9.956*** -23.68***
[1.063] [5.968]
yt 146.8***
[29.03]
yt 1 -115.0***
[29.03]
t 153.4***
[28.75]
t 1 -119.0***
[27.49]
rst 1 -0.614***
[0.115]
N 56534 56070 56534
R2 0.15 na na
Anderson canon. corr. LR statistic 2953.8 202.8 17.7
Chi-sq P-val 0 0 0
Cragg-Donald F statistic 189.555 16.924 3.55
5% maximal IV relative bias 21.3 17.8 9.5
10% maximal IV relative bias 11.5 10 6.6
Hansen-Sargan J statistic 1472.2 201.8 1.92
Chi-sq(15) P-val 0 0 0.383
Endogeneity test 764 1179.3 206.3
Chi-sq P-val 0 0 0
Instrumented tat tat; Qt;t tat; Qt;t
included instruments tat 1;tat 2 tat 1;tat 2 tat 1;tat 2
Qt 1;t 1 Qt 1;t 1
yt;yt 1;
t; t 1; rst 1;
excluded instruments yt;yt 1; yt;yt 1; rst; rlt; rlt 1;
t; t 1; rst; t; t 1; rst; rext; rext 1
rst 1; rlt; rlt 1; rst 1; rlt; rlt 1;
rext; rext 1 rext; rext 1
Standard errors in brackets * p<0.05, **p<0.01, *** p<0.001
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The theoretical literature on the role of mergers and acquisitions is comparatively thin.
On the theoretical side there is Gort (1969) and more recently Xu (2017) and on the em-
pirical side Andrade et al (2001), Andrede and Sta¤ord (2004), Doytch and Uctum (2011),
Maksimovic and Phillips (1998, 2002), Schoar (2002) and Warusawitharana (2007). Buy-
ing another rm may is a way of acquiring a patent or technology rather than investing
directly in R&D, as in the work of Xu (2017).
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